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Editorial Note
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1   This policy brief discusses a key paradox in relation to Zimbabwean migration 
into   South Africa. While Zimbabwean migration since 2000 has been the 
largest concentrated flow in South African history, South Africa’s reaction to this 
movement has been characterised by the attempt to continue with ‘business as 
usual’ and ‘no crisis’ responses.1  Compared with most other developed and 
developing countries, where an inflow of tens or hundreds of thousands of 
people is usually treated as a political crisis, such a non-response to over a 
million immigrants requires explanation. 
 
1.2  The lack of commensurate responses is especially noticeable within the various 
departments of the South African government, but also within much of 
organised civil society. The scale and range of responses has addressed 
neither the scale nor the specific nature of Zimbabwean migration.2 In practice, 
therefore, addressing migrant needs and migration impacts is left to social 
networks among Zimbabweans, (often poor) South African citizens and local 
level public service providers such as local clinics. As a result of this 
fragmented and inadequate set of responses there are two major gaps:  
 firstly between the needs of Zimbabwean migrants and the formal 
institutional frameworks and services provided to them, and  
 secondly between the impacts of Zimbabwean migration on South African 
society and its ability to manage these impacts.  
 
1.3   There has been increasing documentation of Zimbabwean migrants’ welfare 
needs in South Africa (Bloch 2005; Zimbabwe Torture Victims Project 2005; 
Makina 2007; CoRMSA 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008). However, in parallel 
to the lack of coherent government and civil society responses to Zimbabwean 
migration, there has been a relative dearth of academic or think-tank 
documentation or analysis of these responses, and indeed of the implications of 
non-response for South Africa (Polzer 2008). Crucially, there has been no 
serious research on the dispersed and privatised responses by Zimbabwean 
networks and South African citizens, even though the aggregate impact of 
these actors is likely to be at least as significant, if not more so, than formal 
responses.  
 
1.4  This brief cannot comprehensively address this last knowledge gap, as more 
empirical work is required to characterise and quantify informal responses, but it 
will briefly set out the range of both informal and formal responses to 
Zimbabwean migration by key governmental and civil society actors. These 
responses are evaluated using three different perspectives: (a) law and rights-
centred; (b) developmental and migrant needs-centred; and (c) politics and 
institution-centred. Each of these perspectives asks a different central question, 
                                                
1 Zimbabwean migration to South Africa since 2000, even if estimated conservatively at 1 to 1.5 million 
Zimbabweans in the country, is c. three times larger than the estimated movement of Mozambican refugees 
into South Africa in the 1980s during the Mozambican civil war, which previously constituted South Africa’s 
largest migration volume in recent history. 
2 Due to the ‘mixed’ nature of Zimbabwean migration,  the term “migrant” is used here  to describe all people 
of Zimbabwean origin who have entered or are staying in South Africa, including those who are eligible for, 
have applied for, or received asylum or refugee status.   
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and each highlights the roles of different actors within the heterogeneous 
categories of ‘government’ and ‘civil society’. 
 
1.5   The legal and rights-based perspective looks at the international and domestic 
legal responsibilities of the government towards Zimbabwean migrants and 
therefore asks what government responses should be and how existing 
responses compare with these responsibilities. Key actors are governmental 
departments such as Home Affairs, the police and the social welfare 
departments of Health, Education, Social Development and Labour, as well as 
local municipalities. Civil society’s role, from this perspective, is either to monitor 
government actions and advocate with government to fulfil its obligations, or 
else to partially fill service gaps by providing parallel services. 
 
1.6  In contrast, a migrant-centred and developmental perspective focuses on the 
question of what Zimbabwean migrants actually do and need and how 
governmental and civil society responses support or undermine these needs, 
whether or not these needs or responses are enshrined in law as rights or 
obligations. An example is the need of most Zimbabweans in South Africa to 
earn and remit money and goods to family members remaining in Zimbabwe, 
which is a key developmental issue but not one clearly defined as a right in 
either domestic or international law. From this perspective, Zimbabweans 
themselves are key actors in their own right, both as individuals and as more or 
less formal associations, and informal practices, relations and structures within 
governmental and non-governmental spheres in South Africa are as important 
as formal policies. 
 
1.7   Finally, a political and institutional perspective asks why South African 
institutions have responded to Zimbabwean migration in they ways they have 
done. It is necessary to explain the overall lack of an ‘emergency’ atmosphere - 
the ‘business as usual’ approach - as well as explaining why particular 
responses have been taken while others have been rejected or ignored, and 
why the responses by different actors remain essentially fragmented rather than 
coordinated. In addition to the governmental and non-governmental actors 
considered in our first legal/rights perspective, this political perspective brings in 
actors not otherwise directly involved in providing services to or making policies 
about Zimbabweans in South Africa but who have important impacts on the 
context in which such policies are made, such as the Office of the Presidency 
and Parliament. 
 
1.8   Considered together, these perspectives allow the following conclusions 
regarding our central paradox. The South African government has not fulfilled 
its international or domestic legal obligations towards Zimbabwean migrants, 
leading to significant abuses of Zimbabweans’ rights. Civil society has been 
largely ineffective in putting pressure on the government to change its policies 
and practices in relation to Zimbabweans and has also not been able to 
mobilise and coordinate a sufficient parallel welfare support and protection 
system. Responses to welfare and protection needs have instead been located 
mainly among Zimbabwean networks and in poor South African communities 
and have therefore been decentralised, localised and informal. With rising 
numbers and the increasing vulnerability of Zimbabweans coming into South 
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Africa since 2005, these informal networks and localised responses are 
increasingly unable to fulfil basic welfare and livelihood needs. 
 
1.9  Political reasons for the seeming paralysis within government concerning 
Zimbabweans in South Africa include a combination of domestic pressures for 
service delivery to poor citizens and South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ foreign 
policy stance towards the Government of Zimbabwe. Humanitarian (shelter and 
food) and refugee rights (blanket legal recognition) approaches are domestically 
sensitive, while refugee rights and security-based (control and segregate) 
approaches would sit uncomfortably with South Africa’s role as ‘neutral arbiter’ 
in Zimbabwe. The key characteristic of ‘business as usual’ approaches is that 
they do not require the government to make an open policy statement to either 
its domestic or regional constituencies. Many mainstream civil society 
organisations, including a number of social movements (with some notable 
exceptions), also see service provision to and advocacy on behalf of 
Zimbabweans as incompatible with their domestic poverty alleviation mandates 
and the ‘South Africans first’ expectations of their members. Furthermore, there 
has been an antagonistic relationship between government and civil society on 
Zimbabwean issues generally, counteracting the possibility of joint interventions. 
 
1.10  Finally, institutional factors have played an important role in delaying and 
undermining effective coordinated responses. South Africa’s general policy of 
urban self-sufficiency and self-settlement for refugees means that there are no 
institutions in place to provide large-scale shelter and welfare assistance. There 
has also not been a previous comparable large-scale migration flow in 
democratic South Africa’s institutional experience. Other factors include a lack 
of leadership willing or able to galvanise the required multi-departmental 
commitments within government; and a fragmented civil society with limited 
capacity to scale-up localised welfare interventions or to coordinate a unified 
position on Zimbabwean migration. 
 
 
2.0 Post-2000 Zimbabwean Migration to South Africa 
 
2.1   The nature of a specific migration situation determines not only which 
responses are necessary and appropriate, but also how decision-makers come 
to perceive and understand the migration flow and how they therefore react to it. 
Zimbabwean migration to South African since 2000 has had several 
characteristics which have objectively and subjectively complicated responses. 
These include volumes and ‘mixed’ motivations for migration, the latter in turn 
leading to specific timing and phasing of flows, demographics and dispersion. 
 
2.2   The issue of volumes and numbers has multiple facets. On the one hand, while 
there are no empirically reliable statistics on the number of Zimbabweans who 
have entered South Africa since 2000 (estimates range from 1 million to 5 
million and vary so greatly because of the high percentage of undocumented 
border crossings, as discussed below) even conservative estimates clearly 
make it by far the largest national group of migrants in South Africa.3  While 
                                                
3 For a discussion of estimates of Zimbabwean numbers see Landau, L. B. (2007). Drowning in Numbers: 
Interrogating New Patterns of Zimbabwean Migration to South Africa. Johannesburg, briefing prepared for 
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such large numbers could be expected to trigger a concerted government 
response, perceptions about the numbers, on the other hand, have served to 
delay action. Government officials (especially at national level) argue that they 
cannot plan without more exact statistics, while officials at municipal level and in 
service delivery departments have such inflated perceptions of numbers that 
they feel completely paralysed. For example, city officials in Johannesburg 
believe there are 2.5 million foreigners in the city, mostly Zimbabwean, which 
would be over half of the total city population (Centre for Development and 
Enterprise 2008:8). 
 
2.3  Mixed motivations are the norm for most migration, but Zimbabwe is an extreme 
case where there is political repression without outright civil war and where 
progressive economic collapse has reached deadly proportions. There are 
therefore many different ‘types’ of Zimbabwean migrants and many individuals 
who are motivated by multiple factors. These ‘types’ include politically 
persecuted refugees, economic migrants (from professionals to unskilled 
persons), humanitarian migrants (including unaccompanied children), traders, 
shoppers and transit migrants. 
 
2.4  The implications of this ‘mixed migration’ for host country responses include the 
following: different kinds of migrant need different services; different legal 
frameworks apply; and different kinds of governmental and civil society 
institutions are required. Crucially, since there are as yet no international or 
domestic legal frameworks for dealing with mixed migration holistically, the 
fragmented legal instruments dealing separately with politically,  economically 
and humanitarian motivated migration (e.g. the Refugee Act, the Immigration 
Act and the Disaster Management Act, respectively) have been applied without 
adaptation or coherence.4 Furthermore, since the South African government 
has considered most of the ‘economic’ migration from Zimbabwe essentially 
illegitimate and illegal, this further undermined the possibility of constructing a 
coordinated response for all (different kinds of) Zimbabweans in South Africa. 
Finally, because of the variety of ‘push factors’, the intensity, demographics and 
dispersion of Zimbabwean migration, and the range of migrant needs, have 
affected the development of coherent responses. 
 
2.5   Concerning the intensity of the flow of Zimbabweans into South Africa, there 
has been a continuous and continuously growing daily (or nightly) ‘trickle’ of 
Zimbabweans across the border. This stands in contrast to a single large-scale 
flow of tens or hundreds of thousands of people crossing the border at one time 
or within weeks or months, as was the case with Mozambicans refugees in the 
1980s or Congolese refugees fleeing into Uganda today. South African 
emergency plans prepared in advance of the 2002, 2005 and 2008 
Zimbabwean elections all set the trigger for action as a ‘mass influx’, defined as 
a thousand people crossing the border in a day (del Valle and Polzer 2002:11). 
                                                                                                                                            
Centre for Development and Enterprise, Vigneswaran, D. (2007). Fact or Fiction: Examining Zimbabwean 
Cross-border Migration into South Africa. Migrant Rights Monitoring Project Occasional Report, 2007/B. 
Johannesburg FMSP. 
4 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has started discussions on mixed 
migration, but these have not yet been translated into generally accepted models for legal or humanitarian 
response (UNHCR (2007). Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: a 10-Point Plan of Action. Geneva. 
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Even though cumulative numbers had already long surpassed this in 2002, an 
emergency response was never initiated because there was no recognisable 
‘mass influx.’ Perceptions about how large scale migration ‘should’ look 
hindered concerted institutional action.  
 
2.6 The  nature of Zimbabwean migration has changed over time. Until 2000, the 
majority of Zimbabweans were young job seekers, often motivated by the 
humanitarian needs of their families in Zimbabwe but mostly migrating alone 
(McDonald et al 2000; Tevera and Zinyama 2002).  In the last 2-3 years, there 
has been an increase in humanitarian migrants in search of basic food and 
health care, including larger percentages of women, children and elderly. 5 
Levels of malnutrition and illness of new arrivals have increased greatly. The 
implications of this demographic shift is that Zimbabwean migrants initially fit 
the established pattern of labour migrants and were to some extent self-
sufficient in terms of basic welfare due to their ability and desire to work. This 
removed the necessity for either government or civil society to plan large-scale 
welfare interventions initially. When the humanitarian needs of new arrivals and 
those already in the country rose gradually, there was again no clear trigger for 
the establishment of new welfare interventions until needs reached crisis point 
in specific locations (such as the border area since mid-2008).  
 
2.7   The motivation to earn money to send home and the presence of existing 
networks  led to Zimbabweans dispersing throughout the country and especially 
to urban areas rather than remaining concentrated in the rural border area. This 
means that the initial impact of the large numbers was also dispersed, delaying 
the perceived pressure for national responses. It also means that legal and 
welfare responses have to be dispersed or accessible across the country, 
involving a wide range of governmental and civil society actors in different 
provinces and cities. This means a more complex and easily fragmented 
response scenario than if, for example, resources and institutional response 
capacity were concentrated in one part of the country. 
 
2.8   Finally, mixed migration motivations and circumstances mean that migrants 
have a wide range of needs against which the effectiveness of responses (and 
the choices of response institutions) can be evaluated. These needs include 
immediate humanitarian needs for food, shelter and health care; longer term 
social welfare needs for the same things, as well as education for children; 
livelihood needs for income opportunities, labour rights, and access to 
remittance methods, etc.; and finally, protection, including physical safety, legal 
security and non-refoulement.6 This wide range of needs implicates an equally 
wide range of institutions within government and civil society to respond and 
requires a level of coordination among these generally very different actors (e.g. 
between the police providing protection and a faith-based organisations 
providing shelter).  
 
3.0   Government Responses 
                                                
5 Persons fleeing political persecution have arrived throughout, but with massive increases in asylum 
applications since 2005. 
6 Refoulement is a key concept in international (and South African domestic law) referring to the return of a 
refugee to a country in which he or she would be endangered. See 1998 Refugee Act, Section 2. 
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 In this complex mixed migration context, how have the various arms of the 
South African government responded in practice? We can divide government 
responses into three types: migration management and socio-economic rights, 
livelihood support, and leadership and coordination. These correspond to the 
three perspectives of law, needs and politics. 
 
3.1  Migration Management and Socio-Economic Rights 
 
3.1.1  This section looks first at the government’s approach to migration management   
and the legal right to protection in relation to Zimbabweans, and then looks at 
its responses in relation to the socio-economic rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. It must be recognised that South Africa’s current policy and 
institutional framework was not set up to deal with large-scale migration flows, 
and that it has never had to deal with such a situation before. In contrast to 
countries where large numbers of refugees have been housed in camps for 
many years, South Africa’s general policy of urban self-sufficiency and self-
settlement for refugees means that there are no institutions in place to provide 
large-scale shelter and welfare assistance. It is precisely this discrepancy 
between need and response infrastructure which makes it necessary to explain 
South Africa’s “business as usual” approach.  
 
3.1.2 This approach has been most pronounced in the migration management field, 
where the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is the lead actor. South African 
migration frameworks have been applied to Zimbabweans in the same way as 
to other nationalities without any adaptation to their specific circumstances or 
numbers. These frameworks include visa regulations, the 2002 Immigration Act 
and the 1998 Refugee Act. The desire by the South African government not to 
introduce policy changes in relation to Zimbabweans is exemplified by the visa 
policy. While visas have been progressively liberalised and abolished for other 
neighbouring countries since the mid-2000s, as envisioned for the entire region 
by the SADC Protocol for the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, Zimbabwe is 
the only neighbouring country for which there is still a visa policy (Oucho and 
Crush 2002).  Zimbabweans require a valid passport, an expensive visa from 
the South African Embassy in Harare, a letter of invitation, proof of sufficient 
hard currency for their stay in South Africa and similar conditions which are 
impossible for all but a very few well-off Zimbabweans to meet. So onerous are 
these pre-conditions, that they have forced the majority of Zimbabweans to 
cross into South Africa informally and without proper documentation.  
 
3.1.3 Once they are in the country, the dominant government response to date has 
been the arrest and deportation of undocumented Zimbabweans on the basis of 
the Immigration Act. Deportation numbers for Zimbabweans have been rising 
steadily since 2000, reaching over 150,000 in 2005 and continuing to rise since 
then. Since 2005, Zimbabweans have been by far the largest national group 
deported, and have fuelled a massive overall increase in annual deportation 
numbers.7 The primacy of deportation as a response shows clearly that the 
DHA, and the South African Police Services which assist DHA in Immigration 
                                                
7 Exact Zimbabwean deportation number are not publically available, since the DHA stopped breaking down 
their deportation statistics by nationality in 2005. 
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Act enforcement, continue to see Zimbabweans primarily as economic migrants 
rather than as people in need of humanitarian assistance or asylum. Some 
skilled Zimbabweans continue to apply for and receive normal work and study 
permits, as was the case before the escalation of the Zimbabwean crisis, and 
the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) has reported a steep rise in 
applications by professional Zimbabweans.8 No measures have been put in 
place to facilitate or expedite Zimbabwean work or study permits or 
qualifications approvals beyond normal (expensive and slow) processes.  
 
3.1.4 Zimbabweans have been able to access the asylum system, although again this 
has been implemented by DHA in a conservative and ‘business as usual’ 
manner. There have been some indications of attempts at exclusion, such as 
the 2002 ‘white listing’ of Zimbabwean asylum applicants in some Refugee 
Reception Offices and several ‘manifestly unfounded’ asylum rejections in 2007. 
These were challenged in court by legal NGOs and now do not seem to be 
more widespread for Zimbabweans than for other nationalities.9 However, even 
in its ‘normal’ operations, the asylum system has taken a narrow interpretation 
of the Refugee Act which makes it less responsive to the particularities of 
Zimbabwean migration than it could be. While the Refugee Act includes 
provision for granting a priori refugee status to a group of persons, or for 
granting individual asylum to persons fleeing ‘events seriously disturbing or 
disrupting public order.’10 DHA has largely limited its status determination to 
persons fleeing individual persecution, thereby excluding the majority of 
Zimbabweans. In addition, the urban locations of Refugee Reception Offices 
and administrative inefficiencies in the asylum application process severely 
curtail access to the system, even for those individuals who have experienced 
personal political persecution. Even though asylum applications from 
Zimbabweans rose steadily after 2004 but had cumulatively still only reached 
44,000 by the end of 2007.  At that time, only 1,000 had been approved, 9,000 
were rejected and 34,000 were still pending.  In 2007 itself, 17,667 
Zimbabweans applied for asylum but only 271 were approved and 1,628 
rejected.11 This only represents a small proportion of the overall Zimbabweans 
in South Africa.  
 
3.1.5 The use of different legal frameworks for migration management could be 
interpreted as a sign that the government recognises the diverse motivations for 
Zimbabwean migration. In practice, however, none of the standard migration 
management instruments are able to fulfil their functions in relation to different 
groups of Zimbabweans because they are applied indiscriminately and are not 
                                                
8 Alet Rademeyer, “Zimbabweans keen to work in SA”, 27 May 2008. SAQA website 
http://www.saqa.org.za/show.asp?include=news/work.html (accessed 23 January 2009) 
9 These legal challenges were conducted by Lawyers for Human Rights and the Wits Law Clinic. 
10 South African Refugees Act, No. 130 of 1998, Section 3(b). There is a debate whether the ‘events 
disturbing public order’ refugee definition (based on the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa) could be applied to all Zimbabweans. The Jesuit Refugee Services 
is advocating that all Zimbabweans should qualify for asylum under the OAU Convention definition on the 
basis that the economic crisis which is driving many Zimbabweans to emigrate in search of work and food is 
in fact a politically created crisis. On the other hand, the UNHCR states that most Zimbabweans would not 
qualify under the OAU refugee definition. 
11 Department of Home Affairs Refugee Directorate, Annual Report on Asylum Statistics (Department of 
Home Affairs, 2007) 
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adapted to the mixed nature of Zimbabwean migration. The deportation system, 
even if one could argue for the legitimacy of returning ‘illegal economic 
migrants’ to starvation and disease on strict legal lines, has also been leading to 
the refoulement of political asylum seekers who have not been able to access 
to asylum system. The asylum system, due to the lack of other documentation 
alternatives, is being used by people predominantly seeking humanitarian and 
livelihood support. Since September 2008, the DHA has now in effect 
legitimised this by setting up a refugee reception centre in Musina, near the 
Zimbabwean border crossing, and issuing asylum seeker permits to virtually all 
Zimbabweans coming to the centre, without attempting to judge the validity of 
their asylum claims. Even though this could be seen as an appropriate 
expansion of the asylum definition, as discussed in the last paragraph, in fact 
the asylum seeker permits are being used as a temporary stop-gap measure, 
without consideration of how DHA will later deal with the need to renew these 
permits or to confirm or reject them through a formal refugee status 
determination process. 
 
3.1.6  It is important to note several possible migration management responses which 
were discussed but not taken up by the Department of Home Affairs. The 
Immigration Act provides for a Ministerial exemption from standard permit 
requirements. Granting a temporary permit to all Zimbabweans, including the 
right to be in the country legally and the right to work, in terms of Section 31(2)b 
of the 2002 Immigration Act was debated within the DHA to the extent that the 
Minister made a media announcement concerning the possibility of introducing 
such a permit in July 2008. This was, however, never implemented. The 
Section 31(2)b discussion took place in the context of widespread violence 
against foreigners, including many Zimbabweans, in May 2008 and in the same 
context there were discussions of putting a moratorium on the deportation of 
Zimbabweans.12  However, again, this was not implemented consistently and 
arrests and deportations continue. 
 
3.1.7 Compared with migration management and protection responses, the 
government’s responses in terms of socio-economic rights are based on a 
different legal basis (the Constitution and the Disaster Management Act) and 
located in different departments (Health, Education, Housing, Social 
Development, Labour, and Provincial and Local Government) and levels of 
government (municipalities). As with migration management responses, 
however, these actors have generally, with a few small exceptions, continued 
with ‘business as usual’ and have not instituted any special or expanded 
interventions in relation to Zimbabweans.  
 
3.1.8 The South African Constitution sets out basic socio-economic (in addition to 
civil) rights for ‘everyone’, without discrimination by nationality or legal status. 
These include the right to basic health care, basic education, adequate housing, 
sufficient food and water, and social security. It also includes the right to fair 
                                                
12 Starting on 11 May 2008 in Alexandra informal settlement in Johannesburg and spreading to several other 
informal settlements in Gauteng and Western Cape Province (and a few other areas around the country), 
hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals were attacked and displaced over the space of a month. Over 
sixty persons were killed and thousands of foreign-owned and run homes and businesses were looted and 
burnt. 
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labour practices, although not the right to work. The respective government 
departments are responsible for upholding these rights in their public service 
provision. 
 
3.1.9  On the one hand, Zimbabweans experience the same kinds of discrimination 
and exclusion from public services to which they have a right (especially basic 
health care and education) as other non-citizens (CoRMSA 2008). This does 
not mean absolute exclusion: for example, a recent survey of non-citizens who 
access assistance through NGOs suggests that over 70% of Zimbabweans 
have been able to access basic public health care when they need it and that 
55% of school-age Zimbabweans children are attending school (CoRMSA 
2008:42;46). However, this also means that almost a third are having difficulties 
accessing health care and half of school-age children are not accessing 
education to which they have a basic right.  
 
3.1.10  In addition to the obligation to uphold Constitutional rights for ‘everyone’, 
Zimbabweans pose a particular and large-scale service challenge to South 
Africa, beyond that of other non-national groups, as I have been arguing. 
However, this has not resulted in any significant dedicated responses, nor in 
concerted and coordinated efforts to integrate Zimbabweans into mainstream 
social welfare service provision. The Department of Health has instituted a 
directive that antiretroviral treatment for HIV and AIDS should be made 
available to ‘refugees and asylum seekers irrespective of whether they hold 
documents’ (Department of Health 2007), which in practice includes most 
Zimbabweans. However, there has been no process, for example, for 
evaluating in which locations local clinics and hospitals are under additional 
pressure from Zimbabwean settlement (such as in certain inner-city 
neighbourhoods of Johannesburg or some rural areas of Limpopo Province) 
and providing additional funding and staff to those health services. There have 
been no directives or resource allocation initiatives by the Departments of 
Education, Housing or Social Development. In the case of the latter, one of the 
Department’s standard social welfare grants - the Social Relief of Distress grant 
- is not limited to citizens and could be applied as an emergency humanitarian 
relief mechanism, but has not consistently been promoted in this way. The 
Department of Social Development is also mandated to provide services to 
unaccompanied minors but has not implemented a sufficiently large-scale 
programme for the increasing numbers of Zimbabwean unaccompanied minors. 
 
3.1.11  While Constitutional provisions obligate the government to protect socio-
economic rights in every-day life, the 2002 Disaster Management Act provides 
the government with a legal framework for providing welfare and protection in 
emergency situations. Managed through the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government, where the National Disaster Management Centre is located, the 
Act pertains to situations where Zimbabwean settlement “causes or threatens to 
cause: (i) death, injury or disease; (ii) damage to property, infrastructure or the 
environment; or (iii) disruption of the life of a community; and (b) is of a 
magnitude that exceeds the ability of those affected by the disaster to cope with 
its effects using only their own resources.” 13  The Disaster Management 
                                                
13 Disaster Management Act, No. 57 of 2002, Section 1 
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framework has been used to prepare a national disaster management 
contingency plan as well as a Limpopo provincial plan and a municipal-level 
plan in the Musina border area, yet to date no disaster has been declared at 
national, provincial or municipal level in relation to Zimbabweans immigration 
and none of these plans have been implemented (nor, indeed, are they 
regularly updated, except in advance of Zimbabwean elections). The option of 
opening a ‘camp’ or some kind of centralised welfare centre for Zimbabweans 
under the Disaster Management legislation, while mooted briefly by the 
opposition Democratic Alliance in 2007,14 was rejected by the Department of 
Home Affairs and has not been publically debated since, although this may 
change with the current (December 2008) outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe and 
it’s spread into South Africa. Indeed, the spread of cholera from Zimbabwe into 
South Africa, and possibly from settlements of Zimbabweans in the Musina area 
who do not have appropriate shelter, water or sanitation, is a stark illustration of 
the lack of effective disaster planning and management. 
 
3.1.12  Finally, local governments are often not considered as actors able to respond to 
migration issues, but they can apply their discretion in providing various 
localised services (or implementing localised migration control measures) to 
migrants based on their own resources and by-laws. For example, in 2007 the 
Johannesburg City Council has debated allocating a municipal building as 
accommodation for Zimbabweans in the city, although this has not yet been 
implemented. Although such initiatives could potentially contribute significantly 
to the overall combination of government responses, they have as yet not done 
so, partly because of the lack of overall policy leadership (as discussed below). 
 
3.1.13  Ironically, therefore, for both migration management and socio-economic rights 
protection, by attempting to use only existing legal instruments to address an 
exceptional migration situation, the South African government has failed in its 
legal obligations, including its obligation to prevent refoulement and to uphold 
basic Constitutional rights. Another effect of applying only existing instruments 
with existing institutional capacity is that these systems have been completely 
overloaded, making them less effective at performing their mandated tasks, 
even for citizens. It requires police and DHA resources to arrest and deport so 
many people, and the asylum system overall has been brought virtually to a 
standstill because of the high number of Zimbabwean applicants. Unsupported 
clinics in inner-city areas with high immigration rates are overcrowded.  
 
3.2  Livelihood Support 
 
3.2.1  Looking at governmental responses in terms of the actual needs of 
Zimbabweans,    rather than from the perspective of legal obligations, there are 
even greater gaps.  In a 2007 survey of over 4,654 Zimbabweans conducted in 
Johannesburg by the University of South Africa (UNISA), respondents noted the 
following priority needs (Makina 2007:5). 
 
 
Table 1: Requirements of Migrant Zimbabweans in South Africa 
                                                
14 Department of Home Affairs (2007). Statement on Transit Shelter for Refugees. Media release. 5 October. 
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Assistance Requirements Cited 
Frequency %15 
Securing Refugee Status 57% 
Setting up own small business 46% 
Work permit 37% 
Employment commensurate with qualifications 35% 
UN assistance to be repatriated back home 4% 
HIV Counselling and Treatment in Government Hospitals 4% 
Legal Counselling 3% 
 
3.2.2  Apart from refugee documentation, the primacy of employment and income-
related priorities is clear. Not mentioned in the list, but clear from the UNISA 
finding that 90% of their respondents send money, goods or both to Zimbabwe 
monthly, is the need for safe and effective remittance transfers. Only 2% of 
respondents reported using formal banking channels with the rest using private 
and informal channels (Makina 2007:7).  
 
3.2.3  In terms of addressing questions of employment, the skills crisis in South Africa 
and the relatively high levels of skills among Zimbabwean migrants could have 
opened opportunities for public sector employers to enable preferential or 
targeted recruitment of Zimbabweans (including fast track work permits). 
However, only the Department of Education has introduced a (badly advertised) 
initiative to facilitate the employment of qualified Zimbabwean teachers, while 
other Departments have made no moves to recruit badly needed qualified 
doctors, nurses, engineers, etc. The Departments of Trade and Industry, Social 
Development and other government bodies tasked with supporting small 
business development have also not introduced any measures to incorporate 
Zimbabweans into their programmes – either as beneficiaries or partners, given 
their often greater entrepreneurial experience than among South Africans. 
 
3.2.4 While South Africa’s asylum system allows recognised asylum seekers and 
refugees to work and set up businesses, the majority of Zimbabweans have not 
been able to access documentation, as discussed above. Even with this 
documentation, private employers often do not recognise or know about the 
right of asylum seekers and refugees to work, and there has been no initiative 
from the Department of Labour to educate employers in this regard (which is an 
issue relevant to all asylum seekers and refugees, regardless of nationality).  
 
3.2.5 A key employment and remittance related concern is migrant access to the 
banking system (again complicated by the lack of documentation). There has 
also been no governmental directive or advisory to banks in this regard, nor has 
been there been any initiative to develop or support remittance systems.  
 
3.3  Leadership and Coordination 
 
3.3.1 The most significant, but also in many ways the least discussed, area of 
governmental (non)response to Zimbabwean migration has been in providing 
                                                
15 Multiple answers were possible. 
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leadership and coordination towards an overall policy position. The only public 
statement on Zimbabwean migration has been President Mbeki’s much quoted 
proclamation in Parliament that "as to this... inflow of illegal people, I personally 
think that it's something we have to live with... it's difficult; you can't put a Great 
Wall of China between South Africa and Zimbabwe to stop people walking 
across."16 Under Mbeki’s Presidency and since his replacement by Kgalema 
Mothlante, there has also been no public policy statement on Zimbabwean 
migration from either the Presidency, Parliament, Cabinet, or the National 
Executive Committee of the ruling African National Congress. There has not 
even been a dedicated debate on Zimbabwean migration in either the 
Parliamentary Committee on Home Affairs or Parliament’s plenary sessions. 
None of the opposition parties have made Zimbabwean migration a major part 
of their political platform – although whether this remains so during the run-up to 
the 2009 national elections remains to be seen. 
 
3.3.2 Apart from public policy statements, there is also no operational framework in 
place for coordinating government interventions regarding Zimbabweans. There 
is, for example, no inter-departmental task team. The Disaster Management 
framework is relatively new and untested, and responsibility is located within a 
politically and institutionally weak ministry which cannot effectively provide 
leadership to departments even though it would have a mandate to do so in 
emergency situations. 
 
3.3.3  The fragmentation and timidity of responses by various departments as 
discussed so far all hinge on the lack of central direction on how Zimbabwean 
migrants should be understood and what the government’s position should be. 
The lack of political leadership and government coordination mechanisms also 
leads to the ad hoc and weak nature of municipal level responses, since they 
are not embedded within a wider national policy framework in relation to 
Zimbabweans. Government has also not provided any guidance to domestic 
civil society, as discussed further below. Finally, international organisations, 
including UN agencies as well as international NGOs, have not able to 
intervene effectively, even though they have experience with different aspects 
of large-scale migration movements, because they require an explicit invitation 
or permission from a host government to operate. 
 
3.3.4  What is striking about governmental and party political responses is not only 
that they have not taken a coordinated stance to protect Zimbabweans in the 
country, but that there have also not been any strong voices for greater control 
or restriction. In the heat of the xenophobic violence in May 2008, several 
politicians and government officials called for tighter border controls, but this 
was not giving political priority before then, and renewed discussions have only 
arisen in December 2008 in reaction to the cholera outbreak. Political 
discussion of migration policy, therefore, has been happening mainly in 
response to sudden and media-profiled deadly emergencies, rather than in 
response to an ongoing large-scale movement of people. Concerning that, 
there has been almost eerie silence.   
 
                                                
16  Speech to National Assembly, Parliament, 17 May 2007. 
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3.3.5 The reasons for this political silence are complex and not yet well documented. 
Further research is needed on the impact of different voices within government 
and especially within the ruling ANC and its coalition partners, including pro- 
and anti-Mbeki factions, the ANC Youth League, the COSATU trade unions and 
the South African Communist Party (the latter two being on record as criticising 
President Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ strategy in Zimbabwe). In addition to links 
between South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe and its domestic 
policy towards Zimbabweans, there are political pressures from domestic 
constituencies suspicious of the use of public resources for foreigners. The 
strength of public (and potential electoral) disaffection with government on 
service provision issues and migration management was evidenced by the 
widespread violence against foreigners in May 2008 in informal settlements. 
 
3.3.6  In summary, government has provided no leadership in responding to 
Zimbabwean migration, its legal responses have been inadequate, and its 
ability to address and support the livelihood needs of Zimbabweans virtually 
non-existent. In this context, how has civil society responded? 
 
4.0   Civil Society Reponses  
 
 While there have been a wide range of civil society-based interventions to 
assist Zimbabweans – including from established and formal South African 
NGOs, more or less formalised faith-based organisations, and ‘Zimbabwean’ 
organisations, including Zimbabwean self-help organisations as well as 
organisations set up specifically in order to assist Zimbabweans – the 
cumulative impact in relation to Zimbabwean numbers and needs has been 
relatively small. We can categorise civil society responses in similar terms as 
with government: relating to migration law and socio-economic rights, livelihood 
support, and leadership and coordination. 
 
4.1  Migration Law and Socio-Economic Rights 
 
4.1.1  As in government, there is a division in civil society between those actors 
dealing with legal and protection issues, and those providing social welfare.  
Most of the longest-established and most institutionally stable organisations at 
the core of the ‘migrant and refugee rights sector’ in civil society are focused on 
legal work, training, monitoring and advocacy – all of which aim at holding the 
government to account in relation to its legal obligations to migrants, rather than 
providing direct protection or welfare services by civil society. Since 
democratisation in 1994, legal organisations have been successful in expanding 
the scope of migrant rights through strategic litigation and have played an 
important part in monitoring the implementation of existing rights by government 
through representing migrants whose rights have been abused. In the case of 
Zimbabweans, this includes overturning the categorical exclusion of 
Zimbabweans from the asylum system in 2002 (see above), and closing down a 
detention centre established for Zimbabwean deportees in Musina in 2007 
which contravened basic conditions of dignity and administrative justice. Most of 
the work by legal organisations has been on an individual basis, however, and 
there have as yet been no broad legal challenges to the government’s 
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deportation policy, its lack of comprehensive legal status provision for 
Zimbabweans, or its lack of socio-economic rights enforcement, for example. 
 
4.1.2  Another key limitation of legal NGOs has been their dual mandate constraint in 
assisting Zimbabweans primarily motivated by economic and humanitarian 
needs. On the one hand, most legal organisations dealing with migrants are 
funded by UNHCR which until 2007 required them only to assist asylum 
seekers and refugees. On the other hand, they are limited by the provisions of 
domestic law, which provides few options for undocumented migrants who do 
not have a strong claim of fleeing persecution. Finally, the effectiveness of legal 
organisations is constrained by the ability and will of government actors to 
implement legal directives. Judgements requiring the Department of Home 
Affairs to expedite its asylum adjudication process have simply been ignored by 
a Department institutionally unable to fulfil its duty. 
 
4.1.3  Another civil society approach has been to offer information as a means of 
facilitating and improving the interaction between Zimbabweans and the 
government. Such information is provided to government actors in the form of 
training on migrant rights, or to migrants and other NGOs concerning means of 
accessing services from government. NGOs also act as intermediaries between 
migrants and government (or private) service providers by advocating with 
specific, often local, actors to improve their service provision. This includes 
convincing schools to admit Zimbabweans children, clinics to treat 
Zimbabweans, police stations to respect asylum permits, and landlords not to 
discriminate against Zimbabweans. While these local initiatives are often quite 
successful in smoothing relations between specific schools, clinics and police 
stations with migrant groups in that location, they generally remain localised, 
are not documented or maintained systematically over time, and are not 
coordinated beyond the local level. 
 
4.1.4  There are some higher level advocacy initiatives, notable through the 
Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) which acts as 
an umbrella body for the sector with member organisations. CoRMSA and its 
partners have advocated with local government in Musina and with city 
governments in Johannesburg and Cape Town, for example, on the need for 
more coherent policies regarding Zimbabweans, yet with only marginal effect. 
Attempts to access and advocate with national government decision-makers 
have not been successful. The South African Human Rights Commission, a 
governmental body but one tasked with independent monitoring of government, 
could potentially play a major role in high-level migrant rights monitoring and 
advocacy. In practice, however, its role has been ambivalent, with CoRMSA 
openly criticising its lack of forceful action on issues such as xenophobic attacks 
on foreigners, including Zimbabweans, and its incapacity to act consistently in 
pushing for better conditions within the asylum system (CoRMSA 2007; 2008).  
 
4.1.5  Despite a growing capacity within the civil society advocacy sector, significant 
problems remain. Migrant and refugee rights advocacy organisations remain 
‘ghettoised’ from other large South African civil society institutions which focus 
on issues of civil and socio-economic rights more broadly. Where Zimbabwean 
issues have brought together a wider range of South African civil society 
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institutions, including labour unions and social movements, this has mainly 
focussed on advocacy regarding the situation within Zimbabwe, rather than 
concerning Zimbabweans in South Africa. 
 
4.1.6  Other advocacy weaknesses in the sector have been the continuation of a 
historical focus on refugee rights (especially access to the asylum system and 
refugee documentation) to the exclusion of undocumented economic migrants, 
including many Zimbabweans. Most significantly, organisations lack the 
capacity for effective high-level advocacy and the advocacy that takes place, as 
mentioned, is often local, ad hoc or insufficient. 17  The lack of access to 
government and the frequently confrontational relationship with the Department 
of Home Affairs has been a particular problem in the sector. 
 
4.1.7  Rather than putting pressure on government to provide services, several civil 
society organisations provide direct welfare services, including the provision of 
shelter or accommodation, food, clothes, school fees for children, and trauma 
counselling. The UNISA study found that Zimbabwean organisations (including 
churches) were cited as providing the most welfare assistance (to 26% of their 
sample), followed by South African NGOs (5%), the South African government 
(3%) and South African churches (2%) (Makina 2007). It is significant that this 
work is mostly (although not entirely) conducted by Zimbabweans themselves 
or by faith-based organisations. This means that most of the funding for these 
activities comes from the communities in which they are located rather than 
from donors.  
 
4.1.8  Since the government does not provide food or shelter, such civil society-based 
welfare provision does not amount to parallel service provision. However, this is 
an issue in relation to health care. A study of anti-retroviral provision to non-
citizens in Johannesburg found that governmental clinics were consistently 
referring non-citizen patients to non-governmental clinics and private hospitals 
for medication and care, in effect abrogating their public duty to provide health 
care (Veary and Palmary 2008). 
 
4.1.9  There are several weaknesses in the non-governmental welfare service 
provision sector. Firstly, NGO welfare services already only cover a very small 
percentage of migrant needs and migrant welfare NGOs are struggling to find 
the capacity and funds to support the growing numbers of Zimbabweans. 
According to the above mentioned UNISA study, even for Zimbabweans based 
in inner city Johannesburg, where most services are located, 60% of 
respondents reported receiving no assistance from any organisation (Makina 
2007). There are virtually no organised welfare (or legal) services outside the 
inner cities of the major urban areas. Second, while there are many small 
organisations offering movable welfare goods (e.g. regular soup kitchens, 
clothes donations, etc.), the great need for accommodation is addressed by 
very few. Third, some of the organisations, including churches which have been 
offering accommodation, do not have the experience, structures and capacity to 
                                                
17 The need for more professional and advocacy was also identified as a key sectoral weakness in 
Palmary’s (2006) review of the migrant rights sector. 
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professionally manage the service, so that there are reported abuses and 
violence within such ad hoc shelters.18  
 
4.1.10  A further concern is that many mainstream South African welfare providers, 
including shelters for the homeless, home based care providers, small income 
generation NGOs, etc. explicitly exclude non-citizens from their services. A 
related point, similar to the above mentioned advocacy ghettoisation, is that 
while many of the migrant and refugee-focussed welfare service providers are 
networked with each other throughout the country (for example, through 
membership in CoRMSA), they are often not networked with the mainstream 
South African service organisations working on housing, food provision, basic 
health care provision, etc.  
 
4.1.11  A significant but badly understood welfare source for Zimbabweans are the 
services which community-based church groups (especially Pentecostal 
denominations) provide to their Zimbabwean members. Such welfare services 
are often not ‘organised’ and work more as informal social networks, but they 
probably (there is as yet no concrete study of this) contribute greatly, along with 
family and community networks, to the welfare needs of recently arrived 
Zimbabweans. 
 
4.1.12  As in government, there is virtually no non-governmental institutional capacity 
or experience in providing emergency response services in South Africa (e.g. 
emergency housing, water and sanitation, health care, logistics, management). 
This is illustrated most strongly by the fact that the National Disaster 
Management Centre (NMDC) does not have any local NGOs, apart from the 
South African Red Cross Society, with which it works. The South African Red 
Cross Society has a national network of branches and can draw on the 
international expertise and support of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC), but its response to the displacement caused by the May 2008 
violence against foreigners demonstrated the limitations of its local operational 
capacity.  
 
4.1.13  Furthermore, the NDMC has only recently started drawing international 
humanitarian NGOs with offices in South Africa into its consultations and plans. 
These include Oxfam, CARE, World Vision, and MSF, all of which have limited 
operations in South Africa and have until recently used the country mainly as an 
administrative base for regional work.  
 
4.2  Livelihood Support 
 
4.2.1  Since formal and legal livelihoods are so strongly dependent on documentation, 
civil society does not have the mandate or power (except through advocacy, as 
discussed above) to intervene in the improvement of livelihood conditions. 
There are NGOs which offer small-scale skills training and income generation 
projects for the migrants they assist, but this is mostly limited to documented 
Zimbabweans. The dominant livelihood support systems, therefore remain 
                                                
18 Of course, it is likely that levels of abuse would be higher if such church-based accommodation were not 
available. 
Southern African Migration Project               Government and Civil Society Responses to  
                                                                         Zimbabwean Migration                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
informal Zimbabwean networks, and the actions of many individual South 
African citizens. For the 60% of (urban) Zimbabweans who report not receiving 
any assistance from organised groups in the UNISA study, as noted above, 
these are the only sources of assistance, and the percentages of Zimbabweans 
overall who primarily depend on these sources is probably much higher (Makina 
2007). 
 
4.2.2  Zimbabwean networks play a key role in providing initial accommodation, 
information about accessing documentation and introduction to various forms of 
employment. The starting point of Zimbabwean networks are people who have 
been living and working in South Africa for many years, since before the current 
political and economic crisis, or who arrived relatively early on in the crisis. 
There are indications, however, that these networks have reached saturation 
point in that the more established Zimbabweans, with legal status, 
accommodation and employment, have already assisted so many family 
members and others that they no longer have any resources.  
 
4.2.3  Such networks are usually not considered in analyses of host country 
responses to migration, because they are informal and because, perhaps, they 
are not ‘legible’ to bureaucratic institutions in either government or formal civil 
society. However, if the purpose of a response analysis is to identify ‘vulnerable 
groups’ in need of assistance, and to identify turning points when humanitarian 
needs reach a critical point for both migrants and the host society; or even if the 
purpose of the analysis, as here, is to understand why and when formal 
institutions respond or not; then understanding how these networks function is 
crucial.  Key questions which impact on the more formal response mechanisms 
include whether some ethnic or regional groups have stronger networks than 
others; whether such networks lead to greater dispersion or concentration of 
new arrivals in the parts of the country; what impact such networks have on the 
ability of Zimbabweans to become self-supporting (both positively for those 
receiving assistance and negatively for those giving assistance); and when the 
resources in such networks become exhausted. The volume of resources and 
assistance costs which the government and formal civil society save because of 
these networks should not be underestimated. 
 
4.2.4  A second commonly ignored livelihood resource for Zimbabweans are 
interactions with individual South African citizens. South Africans, in the form of 
employers, landlords, church-goers, neighbours, taxi drivers, etc. provide what 
we might call radically decentralised responses to Zimbabwean migration. 
While this is the case with all migrants, there are several issues specific to 
Zimbabweans in South Africa. The first is the linguistic and cultural affinity of 
Zimbabwean Ndebele speakers with South African Ndebele and Zulu speakers, 
allowing many Zimbabweans to ‘pass’ as South Africans in everyday 
interactions. The second is Zimbabweans’ generally good command of English 
and relatively high education levels, which enable them to enter into service 
sectors such as the hospitality industry more easily than many other migrant 
groups. Radically decentralised individual responses range from charity to 
xenophobic violence, including casual or full-time employment (whether within 
labour standards or exploitatively), the provision or denial of accommodation, 
protection or identification to immigration policing, etc.  
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4.2.5   Many commentators in South Africa have understood the May 2008 violence 
against foreigners essentially as a public response to Zimbabwean migration. 
The belief that the presence of large numbers of Zimbabweans in townships 
and informal settlements was an immediate trigger of the violence is false, 
however. Research by the Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme in nine of 
the locations where violence broke out shows that perpetrators of the violence 
were not reacting to the mere fact of rising numbers of Zimbabweans (or other 
foreigners) in their areas, but rather to specific local power struggles, 
augmented by the feeling of abandonment by government and political parties, 
including on issues relating to migration management (Misago, Landau et al. 
2008). 
 
4.2.6   As with formalised civil society, the leadership role of government therefore 
impacts on the general citizenry. Without a clearly articulated policy on the 
position of Zimbabweans in South Africa, the general public, who had only been 
told by former President Mbeki to ‘live with’ it, act on the basis of individual 
opinions (often without an understanding of either immigration law or the 
Constitution) of what rights Zimbabweans have in the country. Furthermore, the 
way in which formal government and civil society responses are portrayed (as 
hand-outs, crime prevention, upholding the Constitution, neighbourly solidarity, 
etc.) impact on the willingness of the general citizenry to contribute or constrain 
their own responses. 
 
4.3  Leadership and Coordination 
 
4.3.1  Civil society has experienced many of the same leadership and coordination 
gaps concerning Zimbabwean migration as has the government. These include 
the lack of a single organisation or coalition of organisations to champion and 
coordinate Zimbabwean migration issues; political divisions among different 
sectors of civil society regarding Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans in South Africa; 
and institutional and operational differences which affect coordination and 
cooperation.  
 
4.3.2  As mentioned above, Zimbabwean migration, in spite of the volumes, has not 
become a mainstream priority for South Africa’s large and established social 
justice, democratisation or development NGOs, the faith-based response is 
fragmented, and migrant and refugee rights organisations are relatively 
ghettoised. While coalitions among these different civil society sectors emerged 
around the May 2008 xenophobic violence, there was no similar coalition 
around Zimbabwean migration before then and the collaborations started in 
May died down or vanished soon afterwards. Where there have been broad civil 
society coalitions around Zimbabwean issues in the past, such as the 
Zimbabwe Solidarity and Consultation Forum, these have focussed mainly on 
advocacy regarding the situation within Zimbabwe, rather than concerning 
Zimbabweans in South Africa.  
 
4.3.3  Particularly social movements with broad-based membership among poor 
South Africans have struggled to develop a clear stance on Zimbabwean 
migration. There is a strong popular and media rhetoric in the country that 
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delays in public service delivery to poor South Africans, especially in terms of 
housing and employment creating, is due to the influx of foreigners. Openly 
advocating for the welfare and legal protection of Zimbabweans is therefore 
seen by many as incompatible with the struggle of poor South Africans to 
access services and employment. It is also notable, however, that like with the 
political parties, no major South African social movement or civil society 
grouping has openly advocated for the encampment or expulsion of 
Zimbabweans.   
 
4.3.4  Institutionally, the funding base, capacity and sustainability of organisations in 
the civil society sector varies greatly. Some receive only donations of food, 
clothing etc. from members of the community. Others have annual budgets in 
excess of R5,000,000 (c. USD 500,000) for their work.  A significant number of 
the organisations, particularly those providing for the basic needs of refugees, 
have no donor funding and do not have the accounting structures in place to 
manage such funds (Palmary 2006). Several of the Zimbabwean organisations 
do not have formal offices or are constantly in danger of losing their rented 
spaces due to lack of funding. Most run on volunteer time as with other refugee-
run organisations in the country. This also contributes to the tensions between 
newer, less stable organisations and more established, professional South 
African and Zimbabwean organisations. 
 
4.3.5  Organisations run by Zimbabweans in South Africa are also divided and 
politicised, reducing their potential for a coordinated advocacy position, or for 
galvanising a joint position together with South African organisations. Divisions 
include between long-term, largely professional, Zimbabwean residents (such 
as the Zimbabwean Doctors’ Association, Nurses’ Association, Lawyers’ 
Association, etc.) and more recent arrivals; between Ndebele and Shona 
speakers; and according to party political affiliation. Furthermore, Zimbabwean 
advocacy organisations generally represent urban-based, educated and 
politically-motivated refugees rather than the larger group of Zimbabweans 
spread around the country and mainly concerned with their families’ economic 
survival. 
 
4.3.6  The Ndebele-Shona divide and a general transfer of conflict and distrust from 
within Zimbabwe to South Africa is a feature of Zimbabwean organisations, 
which impacts on their service provision. A related problem is that Zimbabwean 
and other organisations face difficulties in gaining the trust of potential 
Zimbabwean clients. For example, the Zimbabwean Torture Victims Project 
reported in 2005 that “many (actual and potential) respondents [for their survey] 
were reluctant to participate, suspicious of the motives of the interviewers, and 
uncomfortable to disclose information that they felt might be used ‘against 
them’.”(Zimbabwe Torture Victims Project 2005:2). Finally, those Zimbabweans 
who have been able to integrate into townships and work places as Zulu-
speaking South Africans and have acquired South African identity documents 
are often reluctant to come forward to NGOs, especially Zimbabwean NGOs, 
for services, for fear of ‘outing’ themselves as non-South African (Polzer 2007).  
 
4.3.7  In sum, and strangely parallel to government, civil society has not been able to 
impact significantly on the legal framework used by government nor on 
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government’s interpretation and use of existing legal frameworks; it has not 
been able to put in place a parallel welfare system remotely approximating the 
need; there have been only very limited attempts to understand and support 
informal welfare and livelihood support structures for Zimbabweans; and no 
leadership has emergency from civil society to challenge government’s silence 
or to provide an alternative forum for response coordination. 
 
5.0  Conclusions 
 
5.1  This analysis of South Africa’s responses to Zimbabwean migration has 
highlighted two characteristics of South African institutions across government 
and civil society which are not unique to migration management issues: political 
silences and institutional fragmentation.  For regular observers of how states 
deal with migration in the twenty-first century, the most puzzling political 
characteristic of South Africa’s responses to Zimbabwean migration has been 
the silence: the lack of public rhetoric and policy debate. It is particularly notable 
that this silence has stretched across sectors, from government to opposition 
parties, organised civil society and the media. An analysis of the reasons for 
this silence would require a different article, but the tendency to avoid rather 
than engage in open debate on controversial issues must be understood as a 
reflection of wider South African political processes and traditions. Similarly, the 
institutional fragmentation which has underpinned the inability of both 
government and civil society to develop political or operational cohesion on 
Zimbabwean migration is a general characteristic of the current South African 
polity.  
 
5.2  Political silences and institutional fragmentation exist in South Africa beyond the 
specific issue of managing Zimbabwean migration. They have, in the past and 
currently, also impacted on the management of HIV/AIDS, land reform and 
unemployment, as a few examples. While the management of complex mixed 
migrations remains an important area for the development of international, 
regional and domestic legal and policy frameworks, understanding South 
Africa’s (and other countries’) responses to large-scale mixed migration is 
primarily about understanding specific domestic political contexts.  
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